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Twenty years after enactment, the Endangered Species Act of 19731
(ESA or the Act) continues to generate intense discussion and debate.
With reauthorization of the ESA scheduled for 1993, more litigation, and
increased media attention on issues such as the northern spotted owl and
Columbia River salmon, the controversy surrounding this Act is expected
to increase. Characterized as the "pit bull of federal environmental
statutes,"2 the ESA is recognized as an extremely powerful environmental
law The Supreme Court described the ESA as "the most comprehensive
legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any
nation."3
One issue that has received little attention until recently is the
meaning of "species." This article concentrates on the definition of this
term and, more specifically, on the meaning of "distinct population" in the
context of the ESA listing process. Related issues, such as what constitutes
a "population segment" and whether a species may be listed in a significant
portion of its range, are not the primary focus of this paper. Part I reviews
the statutory definitions, relevant legislative history, and case law; Part II
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i. Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884-903 (1973) (currently codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(1988)).
2. Address by Donald Barry, Majority Counsel, House of Representatives Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, Am Bar Assoc. Section on Nat. Resources, Energy and Envtl. Law, Workshop
on Endangered Species (Apr. 6, 1990) (quoted by Robert D. Thornton, Searchngfor Consensus and
Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL.
L. 605 (1991)).
3. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (hereinafter cited as TVA v.
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summarizes recent actions taken by the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS)4 concerning the concept of distinct population as it is applied in
the case of Pacific salmon.5
PART I
A. Statutory Defintions
The ESA protects a group of fish, wildlife, or plants only if that group
is listed officially as an endangered or threatened species. The Act defines
"endangered species"
(6) The term "endangered species" means any species which is
in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of
its range other than a species of the Class Insecta determined by
the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection under the
provisions of this chapter would present an overriding risk to
mankind.'
"Threatened species" also is defined:
(20) The term "threatened species" means any species which is
likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range. 7
A group of organisms can be listed under the ESA only if the group
constitutes a species. Although the ESA uses the term "species," it does not
use "species" in the common biological sense. In the field of biology,
"species" refers to a taxonomic category consisting of "groups of inter-
breeding natural populations that are reproductively isolated from other
such groups."' In contrast, the ESA currently defines "species" as follows:
4. NM FS is an agency within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which is a
part of the Department of Commerce. The Secretaries of Interior and Commerce share responsibility
for administering the ESA. See the definition of "Secretary" under 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15). The
Secretary of Commerce has responsibility for "any species over which program responsibilities have
been vested in the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to Reorganization Plan Numbered 4 of 1970." 16
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2); see Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2090 (1970), reprinted in 5
U.S.C.A. Appendix 1 (1991 Pocket Part); see also Memorandum of Understanding Regarding
Jurisdictional Responsibilities and Listing Procedures under the Endangered Species Act of 1973
(August 28, 1974). The Secretary of Commerce has delegated most ESA responsibilities to the
Assistant Administrator for Fisheries. See NOAA Circular 78-21 (April 4, 1978).
5. NMFS recently responded to petitions to list five stocks of salmon in the Columbia River
system under the ESA. See n. 60-65 and related discussion.
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (although renumbered, this definition is unchanged from the original
language in Pub. L. 93-205 (1973)).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (this definition also is unchanged from the original language in Pub. L.
93-205 (1973)).
8. ERNST MAYR, POPULATIONS, SPECIES, AND EVOLUTION (Harvard University Press, 1970) at
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(16) The term "species" includes any subspecies of fish or
wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any
species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when
mature.9
The statute does not define "subspecies" or "distinct population." In
the biological context, "subspecies" refers to a taxonomic subdivision of a
species consisting of "an aggregate of phenotypically similar populations
of a species inhabiting a geographical subdivision of the range of the
species and differing taxonomically from other populations of the spe-
cies." 10 To be classified as a subspecies, the group of populations must
differ taxonomically, that is by diagnostic morphological characteristics.
The division of species into smaller biological units or populations is less
clear. Although various definitions of the biological term "population"
exist, a population can generally be considered "the community of
potentially interbreeding individuals at a given locality "I' There is some




The Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966 provided protec-
tion only for certain species of native fish and wildlife threatened with
extinction." While the Act did not define the term "species," there was no
indication that a subspecies or population could be protected.
Protection of subspecies began with the enactment of the Endangered
Species Conservation Act of 1969 That Act was designed to protect
species and subspecies of fish and wildlife that were threatened with
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (emphasis added). This definition was amended by Pub. L. 95-632,92
Stat. 3751 (1978).
10. ERNST MAYR, POPULATIONS, SPECIES, AND EVOLUTION (Harvard University Press, 1970)
at 210.
11. Id. 82. Another definition considers a population to consist of "a single breeding unit
characterized by relatively high gene flow within the unit and relatively low gene flow with adjacent
units." W.P Perrin, M.D. Scott, G.J. Walker and V.L. Cass, Review of Geographical Stocks of
TropicalDolphins (Stenella spp. and Delphinusdelphis) in the Eastern Pacific, (SWFC Admin. Rep.
LJ-84-02) at 57. Central to the concepts of "species" and "population" is that there is generally no gene
flow between species, while there is restricted gene flow between populations, at least in the short term,
and virtually unrestricted gene flow within a population. Restricted gene flow, however, may occur at
several levels, making it difficult to identify what is a population and what is not.
12. See Robin Waples, Pacific Salmon and the Definition of "Species" under the Endangered
Species Act, 53(3) MARINE FISHERIES REVIEW 11 (1991); Andrew Dizon et al., Rethinking the Stock
Concept: A Phylogeographic Approach, 6(i) CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 24 (March 1992). See also
John Rennie, Are Species Specious?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN at 26 (November 1991).
13. See Pub. L. 89-669, § 1(a), 80 Stat. 926 (1966).
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worldwide extinction.14
2. The 1973 Act
In response to limitations and inadequacies of these earlier Acts,
Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act of 1973.15 The legislative
history indicates a concern over the limitations of the earlier acts and a
need to broaden the concept of species eligible for protection.'" First, the
1973 Act included protections for threatened species, as well as for those
species facing more immediate risks of extinction. Next, the Act protected
not only species in danger of extinction worldwide, but also species in
danger of extinction in a significant portion of their range. 7 Finally, the
1973 Act defined "species" to include various biological subcategories:
(11) The term "species" includes any subspecies of fish or
wildlife or plants and any other group of fish or wildlife of the
same species or smaller taxa in common spatial arrangement that
interbreed when mature.'"
The legislative history of the 1973 Act indicates a clear intention to
protect populations of wildlife, as well as entire biological species."
14. See Pub. L. 91-205 § 3(a), 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (the terms "species" and "subspecies" were
not defined by this Act).
15. Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973).
16. See Cong. Research Service, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., CONGRESS AND THE NATION'S
ENVIRONMENT (1975), reprinted in Cong. Research Service, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (Comm. Print 1982) at 2.
17 See the definitions of "endangered species" and "threatened species" at 16 U.S.C. §
1532(6), (20). The House Report accompanying the 1973 Act discussed the new definition:
The term "Endangered Species" means any species of fish or wildlife which is in danger of
extinction throughout its entire range, or any portion of its range. This definition is a
significant shift in the definition in the existing law, which considers a species to be
endangered only when it is threatened with worldwide extinction. It includes the possibility
of declaring a species endangered within the United States where its principal range is in
another country such as Canada or Mexico, and members of that species are only found in
this country insofar as they exist on the periphery of their range.
H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in Cong. Research Service, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (Comm. Print 1982) at
149.
This article does not attempt to discuss the appropriateness of listing a species only in a portion of
its range.
18. Pub. L. 93-205 § 3(11), 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (this definition revised by Pub. L. 95-632 § 2,92
Stat. 3751 (1978)). The definition in the 1973 Act is similar to the definition utilized by Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407"
(10) The term "population stock" or "stock" means a group of marine mammals of the same
species or smaller taxa in a common spatial arrangement, that interbreed when mature.
16 U.S.C. § 1362(10).
19. H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), reprinted in Cong. Research Service, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (Comm. Print
1982) at 150. Other legislative history also clearly indicates populations could be listed under the 1973
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While the 1973 Act does not provide detailed information concerning
the species issue, this question should be evaluated in the general context of
the Act's overall goals. The stated purposes of the Act have not changed
since 1973:
(b) Purposes.-The purposes of this Act are to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a
program for the conservation of such endangered species and
threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate
to achieve the purposes of treaties and conventions set forth in
subsection (a) of this section. 0
The Act further declares that it is the policy-of Congress that "all
Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered
species and threatened species "21 The definition of "conserve" is very
broad. 2
The Supreme Court has stated that the "language, history, and
structure of the [ESA] indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities."2 3 Further-
more, the Court has recognized and emphasized legislative history
stressing the value and importance of our genetic heritage:
The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally,
incalculable.
From the most narrow point of view it is in the best interests
of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations. The
Act:
The act covers every animal and plant species, subspecies, and population in the world
needing protection. There are approximately 1.4 million full species of animals and 600,000
full species of plants in the world. Various authorities calculate as many as 10% of
them--some 200,000-may need to be listed as Endangered or Threatened. When one
counts in subspecies, not to mention individual populations, the total could increase to three
to five times that number.
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 160 n. 8 (quoting Keith Shreiner (quoted in letter to the Chin. of the House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Apr. 25, 1977))).
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c).
22. "The terms 'conserve,' 'conserving,' and 'conservation' mean to use and the use of all
methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to
the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Chapter are no longer necessary. Such
measures and procedures include, but are not limited to, all activities associated with scientific resource
management such as research, census, law enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance,
propagation, live trapping, and transplantation, and in the extraordinary case where population
pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, may include regulated taking." 16
U.S.C. § 1532(3).
23. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 174.
1992]
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reason is simple: They are keys to puzzles which we cannot solve,
and may provide answers to questions which we have not yet
learned to ask.
24
3. The 1978 Amendments
The Endangered Species Act Amendments of 197825 replaced the
original definition of "species" with the current language. The plain
language of the revised definition indicates that a distinct population
segment of vertebrate fish or wildlife, but not distinct population segments
of plants and invertebrates, would be considered a species for the purposes
of the ESA. The revision was curiously summarized in the Conference
Report:
S. 2899 redefines the term "species" as it is used in the act. The
existing definition of "species" in the act includes subspecies of
animals and plants, taxonomic categories below subspecies in the
case of animals, as well as distinct populations of vertebrate (sic)
"species." The definition included within the conference report
would exclude taxonomic categories below subspecies from the
definition as well as distinct populations of invertebrates.26
The House Bill had proposed a similar definition, but the conferees
accepted the Senate language.2 7 The legislative history of the 1978
24. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 178, (citing H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 4-5 (1973))
(emphasis added by the Court).
25. Pub. L. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978).
26. H.R. Rep. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978), reprinted in Cong. Research Service,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (Comm.
Print 1982) at 1208.
This summary is confusing. First, it is unclear if a population is considered a taxonomic category
since a population does not have a clear place in the normal taxonomic hierarchy or an associated Latin
trinomial. Thus, to suggest that the original definition included taxonomic categories below subspecies
level or that the revised definition excludes taxonomic categories below the subspecies level is
confusing. Second, the description of the "existing definition" (presumably a reference to the original
definition in the 1973 Act) indicates that a distinct population of invertebrates could not be treated as a
"species." To the extent that at least some invertebrate animals are considered "wildlife," this
statement is in error. Third, to suggest that the revised definition excludes all biological categories
below subspecies from the definition of "species" is also incorrect. Rather, the revised definition would
appear to exclude biological categories below the subspecies level only for plants and invertebrate fish
and wildlife.
27. H.R. 14104 proposed the following definition:
The term "species" includes any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct
segment of the population of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds
when mature.
H.R. 14104, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 22 (1978), reprinted in Cong. Research Service, 97th Cong.. 2d
Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (Comm. Print 1982) at
685; see also H.R. Rep. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 24 (1978), reprinted in Cong. Research
Service, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973
(Comm. Print 1982) at 716. The House Report provides the following explanation concerning this
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Amendments does not further explain the revised definition. Other
proposals to further restrict the definition and exclude most subspecies and
populations were discussed in floor debate and rejected.2 8
4. The 1979 Amendments
The Endangered Species Act Amendments of 197929 did not change
the definition of "species." Nonetheless, the legislative history of these
amendments is particularly informative since the listing of distinct
population segments was a topic of discussion and debate. In testimony
before a Senate committee, General Accounting Office (GAO) officials
criticized the listing of specific populations under the ESA. 30 The Senate
definition:
The existing definition of "species" in the act includes subspecies of animals and plants, as
well as distinct populations of animal "species." The definition in the committee bill would
exclude taxonomic categories below subspecies from the definition as well as distinct
populations of invertebrates.
H.R. Rep. No. 1625,95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in Cong. Research Service, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (Comm. Print 1982) at
749.
28. For example, see the definition of "species" in the amendment offered by Rep. Duncan and
related debate. Cong. Rec. (Oct. 14, 1978) reprzntedin Cong. Research Service, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.,
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (Comm. Print 1982) at 881-884.
See also the definition in the amendment offered by Sen. Garn and related debate. Cong. Rec. (July 19,
1978) reprinted in Cong. Research Service, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (Comm. Print 1982) at 1080-1107.
Also of interest is the proposal to amend the definitions of "endangered species" and "threatened
species." Senator Bartlett proposed to redefine these terms so that the danger of extinction must occur
throughout "all or the essential portion" of the species' range, rather than "all or a significant portion"
of the species' range. Amendment 1426 was agreed to by the Senate. See Cong. Rec. (July 19, 1978)
reprinted in Cong. Research Service, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (Comm. Print 1982) at 1126-i 130; see also S. 2899, as passed by
the Senate, reprzntedin Cong. Research Service, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OFTHE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (Comm. Print 1982) at 1190-1191. This change was not included
in the Conference Report, but research has not revealed any explanation concerning this decision. See
H.R. Rep. 95-1804,95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Cong. Research Service, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (Comm. Print 1982), discussion of
definitions at 1208-1209.
29. Pub. L. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225 (1979).
30. General Accounting Office, ENDANGERED SPECIES-A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE NEEDING
RESOLUTION, Report to Congress 1, 52 (1979). It should be noted that this comment concerned the
1973 definition although subsequent statements indicated the same concern was relevant to the revised
definition.
The definition of species in the 1973 act included any subspecies of fish, wildlife, or plants
and any other group of fish or wildlife of the same species or smaller taxa (group) in common
spatial (space) arrangement that interbreed when mature. This definition permitted FWS
to list populations of species, regardless of their size, location, or total numbers. Thus,
squirrels in a specific city park could be listed as endangered, even though an abundance of
squirrels lived in the same city and elsewhere.
However, the new definition of species will not affect the listing of geographically limited
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Report summarized these concerns:
In testimony before the Resource Protection Subcommittee on
April 3, officials from the General Accounting Office recom-
mended that the subcommittee consider an amendment to the
definition of species currently contained in the act which would
prevent the FWS from listing geographically limited populations
of vertebrates as threatened or endangered. It is the GAO's
contention, based on a draft report which it has conducted on the
administration of the act, that FWS has interpreted the term
"species" to include any population of the animal, regardless of
its size, location or total numbers. According to the GAO, this
could result in the listing of squirrels in a specific city park, even
though there is an abundance of squirrels in other parks in the
same city, or elsewhere in the country 31
This report also indicated that the service agencies opposed revising the
definition:
The FWS and NMFS, on the other hand, oppose such a
change on the basis that it would severely limit their ability to
require the appropriate level of protection for a species based on
its actual biological status. For instance, under the GAO propo-
sal FWS would be required to provide the same amount of
protection for the bald eagle population in Alaska, which is
healthy, as for the bald eagle population in the conterminous
states, which is endangered. One of the weaknesses of the 1969
Act which was corrected in the 1973 amendments was the
inability of the FWS to adopt different management practices for
healthy, threatened or endangered populations.3 2
Congress declined to make any further revisions in the statutory definition,
but at least the Senate Report indicated that "some clarification would be
useful. ' '33 The reaction of the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works was described as follows:
The committee agrees that there may be instances in which
populations of vertebrate, such as the Pine Barrens tree frog or desert tortoise. Therefore,
either the term species should be redefined to exclude all distinct population listings, or
population listings should be limited to significant portions of species' ranges.
Id. at 55. See S. Rep. 151, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in Cong. Research Service, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (Comm. Print
1982) at 1396-1397.
31. S. Rep. 151,96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), reprinted in Cong. Research Service, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (Comm. Print 1982) at
1396-1397
32. Id. at 1397.
33. Id. at 1396.
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FWS should provide for different levels of protection for popula-
tions of the same species. For instance, the U.S. population of an
animal should not necessarily be permitted to become extinct
simply because the animal is more abundant elsewhere in the
world. Similarly, listing of populations may be necessary when
the preponderance of evidence indicates that a species faces a
widespread threat, but conclusive data is available with regard to
only certain populations. Nonetheless, the committee is aware of
the great potential for abuse of this authority and expects the
FWS to use the ability to list populations sparingly and only
when the biological evidence indicates that such action is
warranted.
3 4
5. The 1982 Amendments
The Endangered Species Act Amendments of 198235 revised the
process for petitioning and listing a species but did not change the
definition of "species" from the 1978 version. Nonetheless, the 1982
Amendments are relevant in three respects. First, a special provision was
created for "experimental populations." ' In general, a lesser level of
protection would be provided for a population designated as
experimental.37
34. Id. at 1397 (emphasis added). It is interesting to contrast this underscored language that
indicates that the listing decision may involve at least some discretion with subsequent indications that
this type of decision is nondiscretionary. See H.R. Rep. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess., at 20 (1982)
(the Secretary has "mandatory, nondiscretionary duties" in the listing process). See also Pacific Legal
Foundation v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981) (the Secretary does not have discretion to consider
factors specified under NEPA in the listing process).
35. Pub. L. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1420 (1982).
36. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j), as created by Pub. L. 97-304.
37. To begin with, an experimental population is treated as a threatened species regardless of
whether the nonexperimental population is listed as endangered. Furthermore, the protections that are
applicable depend upon whether or not the experimental population is considered essential to the
continued existence of the endangered or threatened species. Finally, the level of protection depends on
the type of special regulations that are adopted.
Before authorizing the release of an experimental population, the population is to be identified as
essential or nonessential. This finding is very important. Nonessential experimental populations
occurring outside national parks and national wildlife refuges receive little or no substantive protection;
these non-essential experimental populations are treated as proposed species for the purposes of
interagency cooperation. Critical habitat is not designated for a non-essential experimental population.
On the other hand, experimental populations that are determined to be essential to the continued
existence of a listed species and nonessential populations in national parks and wildlife refuges receive
full protection under 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
The experimental population must be identified by regulation; and these regulations can be
expected to specify the protections provided and to address the particular needs of each experimental
population:
The purpose of requiring the Secretary to proceed by regulation, apart from ensuring
that he will receive the benefit of public comment on such determinations, is to provide a
vehicle for the development of special regulations for each experimental population that will
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While it is not clear that "population," as the term is used in the
context of experimental populations, would determine how the term must
be interpreted for listing purposes, it is interesting to note the emphasis on
geographic isolation. A population would be considered experimental only
when it is wholly separate geographically from the nonexperimental
population:
(1) For the purposes of this subsection, the term "experimental
population" means any population (including any offspring
arising therefrom) authorized by the Secretary for release under
paragraph (2), but only when, and at such times as, the
population is wholly separate geographically from nonexperi-
mental populations of the same species.3
This provision does not require these populations to be totally isolated at all
times; in fact, it provides implicit recognition of the biological reality that
populations often overlap in certain areas or at certain times. But in those
areas and during those times where and when the populations do overlap, a
higher level of protection would apply to both groups, presumably because
individuals from both groups would be similar in appearance and difficult
or impossible to distinguish.39
address the particular needs of that population. Each experimental population is to be
treated as a threatened species under the Act which grants the Secretary broad flexibility in
promulgating regulations to protect such species. These regulations can even allow the
taking of threatened animals. The Committee fully expects that there will be instances
where the regulations allow for the incidental take of experimental populations, such as the
inadvertent taking of experimental fish species by those fishing for other species in the same
body of water. The Committee also expects that, where appropriate, the regulations could
allow the directed taking of experimental populations. For example, the release of
experimental populations of predators, such as red wolves, could allow for the taking of these
animals if depredations occur or if the release of these populations will continue to be
frustrated by public opposition.
The Committee believes that involvement of state fish and wildlife agencies in the
regulatory process is crucial. The Committee also believes that where experimental
populations are released on, or near, private land, landowners must be fully apprised of the
release and the regulations under which the population will be managed.
Regulations should be viewed as an agreement among the Federal agencies, the state
fish and wildlife agencies and any landowners involved. Changes in the regulations should be
made after close consultation with all of the affected parties.
H.R. Rep. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 33-34 (1982).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1539)(1).
39. The "look alike" provision is based upon this same rationale:
(e) Similarity of appearance cases. The Secretary may, by regulation of commerce and
taking, and to the extent he deems advisable, treat any species as an endangered species or a
threatened species even though it is not listed pursuant to this section if he finds that-
(i) such species so closely resembles in appearance, at the point in question, a species
which has been listed pursuant such section that enforcement personnel would have
substantial difficulty in attempting to differentiate between the listed and unlisted
species;
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The Conference Report indicates factors that may be used to identify
an experimental population:
Such regulations may identify a population on the basis of
location, migration pattern, or any other criteria that would
provide notice as to which populations of endangered or
threatened species are experimental.40
Second, the legislative history of the 1982 Amendments reemphasizes
the biological categories that can be listed:
Any species or subspecies of fish, wildlife or plants and separate
populations of vertebrate species may be listed. The final
decision on whether or not to list the species as endangered or
threatened rests with the Secretary He must use the best
available scientific and commercial data regarding the status of
the species. 41
Third, the 1982 Amendments clearly indicate that only biological
information is to be considered in the listing process. Listing determina-
tions are to be made "solely on the basis of the best scientific and
commercial data available "42 The House Report stated:
(2) the effect of this substantial difficulty is an additional threat to an endangered or
threatened species; and
(3) such treatment of an unlisted species will substantially facilitate enforcement
and further the policy of this Act.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(e).
40. H.R. Rep. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 34 (1982).
An earlier report provides additional information:
The Committee carefully considered how to treat introduced populations that overlap, in
whole or part, natural populations of the same species. To protect natural populations and to
avoid potentially complicated problems of law enforcement, the definition is limited to those
introduced populations that are wholly separate geographically from nonexperimental
populations of the same species. Thus, for example, in the case of the introduction of
individuals of a listed fish species into a portion of a stream where the same species already
occurs, the introduced specimens would not be treated as an "experimental population"
separate from the non-introduced specimens. On the other hand, specimens of the same
species introduced into a portion of a stream separate from any natural population, such as
when a reservoir or other manmade or natural obstacle acts as a bamer to fish passage,
would qualify as an experimental population. If an introduced population overlaps with
natural populations of the same species during a portion of the year, but is wholly separate at
other times, the introduced population is to be treated as an experimental population at such
times as it is wholly separate. The Committee intends, however, that such a population be
treated as experimental only when the times of geographic separation are reasonably
predictable and not when separation occurs as a result of random and unpredictable events.
H.R. Rep. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 33 (1982).
41. H.R. Rep. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 10 (1982).
42. Pub. L. 97-304, § 4(b), 96 Stat. 1420 (1982) currently codified at 16 U.S.C. §
1533(b)(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis added; the word "solely" was added by the 1982 Amendments). The
use of the "word 'commercial' is not intended, in any way, to authorize the use of economic
considerations in the process of listing a species." H.R. Rep. No. 597, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 19-20
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The addition of the word "solely" is intended to remove from the
process of listing or delisting of species any factor not related to
the biological status of the species.43
6. The 1988 Amendments
The ESA was amended most recently in 1988. 41 The 1988 Amend-
ments provide little information concerning how the term "species" should
be interpreted.45 The only relevant legislative history appears to be the
general statement that:
Any species or subspecies of fish, wildlife, or plants may be listed.
In addition, geographically distinct populations of vertebrate
species may be listed.
46
7 Relevance of Legislative History and its Implications
The role of legislative history in construing statutes is a matter of
considerable debate among jurists, lawyers and scholars. 47 With respect to
the general goals and purposes of the ESA, the Supreme Court engaged in
an extensive legislative history analysis in evaluating Congress's intent
when it enacted the ESA.
48
(1982). The term is used to allow for the use of trade data. Id., see also the Conference Report, H.R.
Rep. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 20 (1982).
43. H.R. Rep. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 20 (1982). The report also notes that the
"Committee strongly believes that economic considerations have no relevance to determinations
regarding the status of species " Id. (emphasis added). See also H.R. Rep. No. 835, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 20 (1982). Similarly, the priority system to be used in the listing process must be
scientifically based.
The listing agencies should utilize a scientifically based priority system to list and delist
species, subspecies and populations based on the degree of threat, and proceed in an efficient
and timely manner. Distinctions based on whether the species is a higher or lower life form
are not to be considered.
H.R. Rep. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 21 (1982).
44. Pub. L. 100-478, 102 Stat. 2306 (1988).
45. See H. Rep. No. 928, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. (1988).
46. H. Rep. No. 467, Report of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 4 (1988). There is no explanation or discussion concerning geographic distinctness.
47 A general discussion concerning the use of legislative history is beyond the scope of this
article. For a discussion of this topic, see Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of
Legislative History in Construing Statues in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court,
39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History
in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV 195 (1983); Shirley S. Abrahamson and Robert L.
Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L.
R. 1045 (1991); and W David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory
Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN L. REV 383 (1992).
48. See n. 19, 23 and 24 and related discussion. The legislative history analysis in TVA v. Hill
was summarized recently as follows:
The Court's decision illustrates the strength of the ESA and of Congress' desire to protect
endangered species. Chief Justice Burger found in the legislative history of the ESA many
occasions when Congress could have softened the language of the Act but did not.
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The language of the statute clearly defines "species" to include a
"distinct population" of vertebrate fish or wildlife. However, the statute is
not clear concerning the meaning of "distinct population." The legislative
history provides some discussion of this concept but provides no specific
guidance. Furthermore, the relevance of this limited legislative history is
somewhat problematic.49 It probably is safe to conclude not only that the
Jared des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption Process under the Endangered Species Act: How the "God
Squad" Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 825, 842 (1991). Another comment was more
critical. Geoffrey L. Harrison, Comment, The Endangered Species Act and Ursine Usurpations: A
Grizzly Tale of Two Takings, 58 Cm. L. REv. 1101 (1991) ("Supreme Court generously appraised
Congress's commitment to the preservation of endangered species").
49. In a recent case involving interpreting the intent of Congress in enacting the Arizona-Idaho
Conservation Act, Pub. L. 100-696, 102 Stat. 4567 (1988), and resolving ambiguities concerning the
interactions between this legislation and the ESA, the court stated:
It is true that in some instances statutes are clear on their face and that no further
interpretative assistance is required: In those cases it is proper to look only to the statute's
plain language. In other instances, however, the language of the statute is uncertain or
ambiguous, and legislative statements, particularly committee reports, can be extremely
helpful in understanding what Congress intended-in determining what the statue means.
Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991).
For an analysis concerning the role of committee reports, statements by sponsors, and floor debates
in determining legislative intent, see Overseas Educ. Assoc. v. F.L.R.A., 876 F.2d 960, n. 41 at 966-970
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (this part of the opinion represents only Judge Robinson's view; see concurring
opinion indicating a belief that there was no need to examine legislative history).
But most of the legislative history and discussion of the distinct population concept occurred after
the definition of "species" was revised to include this phrase in 1978. Such post-enactment legislative
history is often viewed with suspicion. For example, see Justice Scalia's concurrence in Sullivan v.
Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 632 (1990). ("Arguments based on subsequent legislative history... should
not be taken seriously, not even in a footnote.")
"Obviously, the subsequent approval of'a committee report cannot authoritatively define the
intent of a previous Congress in passing a statute." Edwards v. Bowen, 785 F.2d 1440, 1442 (9th Cir.
1986). Still, such reports may provide "some evidence of Congress's earlier intent." Id.
Note that TVA v. Hill involved the issue of post-enactment legislative intent. In that case, TVA
argued that congressional action to continue appropriations for the Tellico dam after the ESA was
enacted indicated Congress' intention concerning how the Act should be interpreted in that situation.
The Court refused to credit this subsequent legislative history.
See William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L. J. 331, at 401-403 (1991); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, at 203-205 (1983).
See also Patsyv. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (legislative history of 1980 Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act considered relevant in interpreting Civil Rights Act of 1871); but see
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 131-32 (1974) ("post-passage remarks of
legislators, however explicit, cannot serve to change the legislative intent of Congress expressed before
the Act's passage"); American Federation of Labor v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
("postenactment comments generally are not reliable indicators of the meaning of statutory text").
Another recent case discussed the relevance of post-enactment legislative history. Michigan
United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1991). This case involved the issue of
whether Congress intended to authorize trapping in National Park areas when it used the language
"hunting and fishing." The court was particularly skeptical of affidavits from individual congressmen
but noted:
However, while post-enactment developments cannot be accorded the weight of contempo-
rary legislative history, and Congress' failure to disapprove a regulation is not dispositive of
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meaning of "distinct population" is ambiguous, but also that Congress has
not directly addressed or resolved this precise question.
C. Case Law
1 ESA Cases
Unfortunately, court decisions also provide little detailed guidance
concerning the meaning of "species" and "distinct population" under the
ESA. Only two cases discuss these issues in any meaningful way
In Fund for Animals v Florida Game & Fresh Water Fish, 550 F
Supp. 1206 (S.D Fla. 1982), a federal district court in Florida stressed the
importance of interbreeding in determining what constitutes a distinct
population or species under the ESA. Plaintiffs in that case attempted to
prevent the hunting of white-tail deer in the Florida Everglades. The Key
Deer is listed under the ESA but the white-tail deer is not. The court
concluded that the white-tail deer was not entitled to protection under the
Act because there was no evidence of actual interbreeding between the two
herds:
Testimony received from the experts established that the
deer in question are Florida white-tail deer, which, although
similar to Key Deer, are not on the endangered species list as are
the Key Deer Further, the testimony established that Florida
white-tail deer do not, in fact, interbreed with the Key Deer,
although it is physically possible for such breeding to occur It is
also physically possible for Key Deer to interbreed with white-
tail deer found in other States. However, due to the Key Deer's
isolated habitat on two islands on the lower Keys, it is geographi-
cally impossible for such breeding to occur in nature, because the
herds have no opportunity to mix. Also, no scientific data was
(sic) presented regarding whether the two herds had ever mixed
in the past.
Based upon the testimony, this Court finds that the
Florida white-tail deer are not a "species" of Key Deer and they
are not entitled to the protection of the Endangered Species Act.
Although the Florida white-tail deer have the potential of
interbreeding with the Key Deer, they do not in fact, do so. The
definition of "species" in the Endangered Species Act contem-
plates the act of interbreeding to occur, in fact, during maturity,
not the possibility that the white-tail deer might someday
congressional intent, the district court would be remiss if it ignored evidence that implies
congressional intent.
Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 949 F.2d at 210.
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biblically know the Key Deer.50
The court did not discuss the level of interbreeding that would result in
a contrary finding. The court referred to the absence of an opportunity for
the two deer herds to "mix." One could argue that isolated straying
incidents and rare cases of interbreeding would not constitute "mixing,"
and thus would not require a contrary finding. Conversely, evidence of
"mixing" or a significant level of interbreeding would suggest that the two
groups should be considered the same "species" under the ESA. While the
court indicated that no data were presented concerning whether these
herds had mixed in the past, there may be reason to believe that Key Deer
evolved from a parent population of white-tail deer that strayed to their
isolated island habitat. Once isolated, the Key Deer could evolve indepen-
dently of the parent population, and thus, distinctive morphological
characteristics, such as a smaller size, could develop. A significant level of
interbreeding would impede the development of such distinctive
characteristics.
In Roosevelt Campobello Int'lParkv U.S. E.P.A., 684 F.2d 1041 (1st
Cir. 1982), the First Circuit discussed the population issue in the context of
the ESA consultation process.51 In that case, the plaintiffs challenged the
issuance of a permit authorizing the operation of an oil refinery The
challenge was based, in part, on the claim that the oil refinery would
jeopardize the continued existence of a population of bald eagles. There
was controversy whether the relevant bald eagle population was limited to
eagles in the northeastern-United States or included such birds in New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton. The court observed:
Even if testimony that Canadian eagles migrated to the United
States or interbred with eagles nesting in the United States could
make consideration of the Canadian eagle population relevant,
the ALJ refused to base his conclusion of no jeopardy on any such
factual basis. 52
These two cases do not clearly explain what the phrase "distinct
population means." Nonetheless, both cases stress the importance of
interbreeding in making distinct population determinations.
2. Other Cases
Other cases not-directly related to the ESA are of questionable
50. Fund for Animals v. Florida Game & Fresh Water Fish, 550 F. Supp. 1206, 1208-1209
(S.D. Fla. 1982) (emphasis in original).
51. Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park v. U.S. E.P.A., 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982).
52. Id. at 1050 n. 5. The court also emphasized the Secretary's exclusive authority not only to list
a species under the ESA, but alsQ to specify the range where a species is endangered or threatened.
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relevance but may provide some insight concerning how the term "dis-
tinct" should be interpreted. "Distinctness" and "distinctiveness" have
been interpreted in the context of other laws. Various cases involving
copyright and trademark law emphasize the "separate" or "apart from"
meaning of "distinctiveness.
5 3
But "distinct" may involve a second meaning that includes the
concepts of "uniqueness" and "importance." At least one court has
interpreted the term "distinctness" to include these concepts.54 Yoder
Brothers v California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir 1976),
concerned the interpretation of the term in the context of the Plant Patent
Act, a law that regulates the issuance of patents for hybrid plants. The
Plant Patent Act identifies varieties and strains of plants that are
distinguishable from more generic or common plant species; similar
factors or considerations might be relevant in determining a "distinct
population" under the ESA.
The characteristics that may distinguish a new variety would
include, among others, those of habit; immunity from disease; or
soil conditions; color of flower, leaf, fruit or stems; flavor;
productivity, including ever-bearing qualities in the case of
fruits; storage qualities; perfume; form; and ease of asexual
reproduction. Within any one of the above or other characteris-
tics the differences which would suffice to make a distinct variety,
will necessarily be differences of degree.55
3. Relevance of Case Law and its Implications
Case law does not define "species" or "distinct population," as these
terms are used in the ESA. The First Circuit considered a related question
in a footnote. 56 A federal district court in Florida evaluated species
determinations for deer but did not provide explicit standards for making
these determinations. Nonetheless, some general guidance is provided by
these two cases. The courts have discussed interbreeding and isolation as
factors that may be relevant in determining what constitute a "species" or
"distinct population." In other cases that are further afield, courts have
interpreted "distinct" and similar terms, but their guidance is even more
general and diffuse. Case law, like the legislative history of the ESA gives
little guidance in determining "species" or "distinct populations" that may
be protected by the Act.
53. See Miller Brewing v. Heilman, 427 F. Supp. 1192, 1200 (W.D. Wis. 1977); and Dunhill v.
Kasser, 350 F Supp. 1341, 1358 (E.D. Penn. 1972).
54. Yoder Brothers v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976).
55. S. Rep. 315, 7 ist Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) (cited in Yoder Brothers v. California-Florida Plant
Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1378 (5th Cir. 1976)).




Recent actions by Federal agencies provide more specific guidance
concerning the meaning of the phrase "distinct population." The Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) share responsibility under the ESA.57 To date, FWS has used
distinct populations as the basis for ESA listings more frequently than
NMFS.5 8 However, FWS' listing determinations reflect a case-by-case
approach to the population issue. For example, FWS listed the silver rice
rat while acknowledging the continuation of "varying interpretations of
the taxonomic status of this rodent."' 59 Similarly, the marbled murrelet
in California, Washington, and Oregon recently was listed as a threatened
species although FWS expressed its intention to reexamine the basis of
recognizing this population of murrelets as a "species" under the Act. 0
These listings and other FWS determinations provide some information
concerning the standards used to make population determinations for
terrestrial creatures.
Of particular interest, however, are recent statements of policy,
decisions, and other administrative actions taken by NMFS with respect to
Pacific salmon. NMFS attempted to address systematically issues con-
cerning the definition of "species" under the ESA and to develop criteria
for making certain population decisions. The agency published interim and
final policy statements on the definition and its application to Pacific
salmon stocks."' In addition, proposed and final listing determinations
illustrate how the policy is implemented. 2
57. Seen. 4.
58. See 57 Fed. Reg. 45,328 (1992) (marbled murrelet); 56 Fed. Reg. 19,809 (1991) (silver rice
rat); 55 Fed. Reg. 12,191 (1990) (desert tortoise); 53 Fed. Reg. 38,453 (1988) (Nile crocodile); 52 Fed.
Reg. 42,068 (1987) (Roseate tern); 52 Fed. Reg. 25,380 (gopher tortoise); and 52 Fed. Reg. 22,430
(1987) (flattened musk turtle).
59. 56 Fed. Reg. 19,811 (1991).
60. The final listing appears at 57 Fed. Reg. 45,328 (1992) with discussion of the population
issueat 45330.See 56 Fed. Reg. 28362 (proposed rule),57 Fed. Reg. 3804 (1992) (notice to reopen the
comment period to solicit additional comments on the status of the species), and 57 Fed. Reg. 33478
(1992) (notice of 6-month extension of the final determination based on substantial disagreement
concerning the sufficiency or accuracy of available data, especially disagreement concerning whether
marbled murrelets m a three-state area constituted a "distinct population segment" under the Act);see
also Marbled Murreletv. Lujan, No. C91-522R, memorandum slip op. (W.D. Wash. Sept. 17,1992).
61. 56 Fed. Reg. 10,542 (1991) (interim policy); and 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612 (1991) (final policy).
62. 56 Fed. Reg. 14,055 (1991) (proposed rule to list Snake River sockeye salmon as an
endangered species); 56 Fed. Reg. 29,542 (1991) (proposed rule to list Snake River spring and summer
chinook salmon as a threatened species); 56 Fed. Reg. 29,547 (1991) (proposed rule to list Snake River
fall chinook salmon as a threatened species); 56 Fed. Reg. 29,553 (1991) (determination that a
proposal to list lower Columbia River coho salmon was not warranted); 56 Fed. Reg. Fed. 58,619
(1991) (final rule to list sockeye as an endangered species); 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (1992) (final rule to list
spring and summer chmook salmon as a threatened species and to list Snake River Fall chinook salmon
as a threatened species).
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A. Columbia River Salmon
1 Petitions to List Salmon Stocks
Under the ESA, NMFS is responsible for salmon. 6 In 1990, NMFS
received petitions to list five stocks64 of salmon in the Columbia River
system under the ESA.65 The five stocks are the Snake River sockeye
salmon, the lower Columbia River wild coho salmon, and the spring,
summer and fall runs of chinook salmon, in the Snake River 8
In responding to these petitions, fundamental questions concerning
the definition of "species" under the ESA needed to be resolved since
NMFS was required to evaluate whether each petitioned stock would
qualify as a "distinct population," and thus constitute a "species" under
the Act. The primary issue was whether the petitioned stocks represented
populations that were distinct from salmon populations elsewhere. Sock-
eye, coho, and chinook salmon exist in other rivers and are abundant in
some areas. However, it is recognized that salmon generally return to
spawn in their natal streams, although natural straying does occur and
total isolation from other populations of the same biological species
probably is rare.
6 7
More specific issues included whether the anadromous Snake River
sockeye stock is distinct from the more plentiful fresh-water kokanee strain
63. Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Jurisdictional Responsibilities and Listing
Procedures under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (August 28, 1974). The Secretary of Commerce
has delegated most ESA responsibilities to the Assistant Administrator for Fisheries. See NOAA
Circular 78-21 (April 4, 1978).
64. The petitions and other documents refer to these groups of salmon in a variety of ways, such
as "stocks," "strains," "runs," or "races." This article uses these terms interchangeably to refer to an'
subgroup of salmon species without denoting whether the subgroup constitutes a "distinct population"
under the ESA.
65. In 1990, NMFS initiated a review of the status of sockeye salmon in the Snake River. 55 Fed.
Reg. 13,181 (1990). On April 2, 1990, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Indian
Reservations petitioned to list Snake River sockeye salmon as endangered under the ESA. NMFS
published a notice on June 5, 1990, announcing the petition presented substantial information
indicating that the listing may be warranted and requesting information from the public. 55 Fed. Reg.
22,942 (1990). On June 7, 1990, NMFS received petitions to list Snake River spring chinook salmon,
Snake River summer chinook salmon, Snake River fall chinook salmon, and lower Columbia River
coho salmon under the ESA. Petitioners included Oregon Trout, Oregon Natural Resources Council,
Northwest Environmental Defense Center, American Rivers, and Idaho and Oregon Chapters of
American Fisheries Society. NMFS published a notice on September 11, 1990, announcing the
petitions presented substantial information indicating that the listings may be warranted and
requesting information from the public. 55 Fed. Reg. 37,342 (1990).
66. The scientific name for sockeye salmon is Oncorhynchus nerka, for coho It is Oncorhynchus
kisutch, and for chinook it is Oncorhynchus tshawytscha.
67. Robin Waples, Definition ofa "Species" under the Endangered Species Act: Application to
Pacific Salmon (NMFS Technical Memorandum 1991) at 5. See also Robin Waples, Pacific Salmon
and the Definition of "Species" under the Endangered Species Act, 53(3) MARINE FISHERIES REVIEW
11 (1991).
MEANING OF "SPECIES"
of that species, whether the various runs of Snake River chinook are
distinct variants, and whether lower Columbia River wild coho stock is
separate from the hatchery strain of coho in the lower river.
2. NMFS Policy Statement and Determinations Concerning Salmon
Attempting to deal with these issues, NMFS published an interim
policy concerning species determinations with respect to Pacific salmon
stocks. 8 After receiving public comments, NMFS published a final
policy 69 The policy was summarized as follows:
A salmon stock will be considered a distinct population, and
hence a 'species' under the ESA, if it represents an evolutionarily
significant unit (ESU) of the biological species. The stock must
satisfy two criteria to be considered an ESU" (1) It must be
substantially reproductively isolated from other conspecific pop-
ulation units; and (2) it must represent an important component
in the evolutionary legacy of the species. Only Pacific salmon
stocks that meet these criteria will be considered by NMFS for
listing under the ESA.7 °
The first criterion, substantial reproductive isolation, involves a
somewhat quantitative evaluation. Reproductive "isolation does not have
to be absolute, but it must be strong enough to permit evolutionarily
important differences to accrue in different population units. '71 While
difficult to measure directly, a variety of indirect evidence may be relevant
in determining the extent of reproductive isolation, including records of the
movement of tagged fish, knowledge concerning recolonization rates,
measurements of genetic differences, and evaluations of the efficacy of
natural barriers.
The second criterion, importance in the evolutionary legacy of the
species, involves a more subjective determination although the determina-
tion must be based on objective evidence and scientific judgment; the
question is whether the population is of substantial ecological or genetic
importance to the species as a whole. Relevant issues in this determination
include whether the population is genetically distinct from other popula-
tions, whether the population occupies distinct or unusual habitat, whether
the population shows evidence of distinctive or specific adaptations to its
environment, and more generally, whether the extinction of the population
68. 56 Fed. Reg. 10,542 (1991); see also Robin Waples, Definition of a "Species" under the
Endangered Species Act: Application to Pacific Salmon (NMFS Technical Memorandum 1991).
69. 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612 (1991); see also Robin Waples, Pacific Salmon and the Definition of
"Species" under the Endangered Species Act, 53(3) MARINE FISHERIES REvIEw 11 (1991).
70. 56 Fed. Reg. 58,618 (1991); see also 56 Fed. Reg. 10,542 (1991).
71. 56 Fed. Reg. 10,543 (1991).
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would represent a significant loss to the ecological and genetic diversity of
the species.
These criteria provide a framework for making determinations
concerning whether a stock of salmon constitutes a "distinct population"
under the ESA. The criteria do not provide a mechanical formula with
automatic answers to population questions; rather, they narrow the issues
and focus the discussion on two key elements. In most cases, these elements
suggest further unresolved questions. As summarized in the supporting
document:
The framework suggested here provides a focal point for accom-
plishing the major goal of the Act-to conserve genetic diversity
of species and the ecosystems they inhabit. At the same time, it
allows discretion in the listing of populations by requiring that
they represent units of real evolutionary significance to the
species.
72
Based on this policy, NMFS determined that Snake River sockeye
salmon is a distinct population and issued a final rule to list this species as
endangered. 73 In contrast, NMFS determined that there was not sufficient
data to identify any wild population of lower Columbia River coho salmon
as reproductively isolated or genetically distinct from hatchery and other
coho populations. Consequently, NMFS issued a notice of determination
concluding that a proposal to list lower Columbia River coho was not
warranted. 74 With respect to the chinook petitions, NMFS issued a
determination that the spring and summer runs of chinook salmon in the
Snake River should not be considered two distinct populations but, as a
group, the combined population should be considered distinct from the fall
run and other chinook populations, and NMFS issued a rule to list Snake
River spring/summer chinook salmon as a threatened species. 75 In another
determination, NMFS concluded that the fall run of chinook salmon in the
Snake River constituted a distinct population and published a rule to list
this species as threatened.76
72. Robin Waples, Definition of a "Species" under the Endangered Species Act: Application to
Pacific Salmon (NMFS Technical Memorandum 1991) at vii.
73. 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (1991); the proposed rule is at 56 Fed. Reg. 14,055 (1991).
74. 56 Fed. Reg. 29,553 (1991).
75. 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (1992); the proposed rule is at 56 Fed. Reg. 28,542 (1991). See also the
response to the comment: Groups of Populations at 56 Fed. Reg. 58,617-18 (1991).
76. 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (1992); the proposed rule is at 56 Fed. Reg. 29,547 (1991).
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B. Legal Basis for the Policy Statement and Determinations
1. Deference and the Standard of Review
Any legal evaluation of an agency action must begin with a recogni-
tion that, generally, an agency has considerable discretion in interpreting
the statutes it administers. An agency's construction of the laws it
administers is accorded considerable weight.77 Similarly, where the
legislative delegation on a particular question is implicit, "a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency "78
In particular, an agency's expertise concerning quasi-technical mat-
ters may be entitled to considerable deference.79 For example, in a case
involving sea turtle conservation regulations, the Fifth Circuit noted that
deference to the agency was greatest when the court was reviewing
technical matters within the agency's area of expertise; the court discussed
NMFS' choice of scientific data and statistical methodology 80 Similarly,
77. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,844(1984). See
also Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983) ("[T]he
court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421,448 (1987); and Am. Petroleum Inst. v. U.S. E.P.A., 858 F.2d 261,264 (5th Cir. 1988).
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the Chevron doctrine in any detail. For more
discussion, see Robert A. Anthony, Which Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and Courts? 7 YALE
J. ON REG. 1 (1990); Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An
Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255 (1988); BENJAMIN W MINTZ, CHM., ET AL., A
GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING (2d ed. 1991) at 335-342; William V. Luneburg, Judicial
Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 243 (1988); Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; Peter H.
Schuck and Donald Elliot, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative
Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984; Cass R. Sunstem, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REv. 2071 (1990); Patricia Wald et al., The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law,
40 Admin. L.R. 507 (1988) (transcript of panel discussion at fall meeting of ABA Administrative Law
Section).
78. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. See also Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694,741 (clear
evidence of congressional intent to preclude agency's interpretation is a "necessary prerequisite here to
rebut the inference that Congress meant to delegate to the Secretary the authority to interpret the
general and ambiguous terms").
79. Baltimore Gas and Elec. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (a
reviewing court "must generally be at its most deferential" when reviewing an agency's scientific
determinations in an area within the agency's technical expertise).
80. "Although we believe appellants' challenge is not totally without merit, we are mindful that
under the arbitrary-and-capncious standard, our deference to the agency is greatest when reviewing
technical matters within its area of expertise, particularly in its choice ofscientific data and statistical
methodology. In reviewing such technical choices, '[w]e must look at the decision not as the chemist,
biologist or statistician that we are qualified neither by training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing
court exercising our narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to certain minimal standards of
rationality.' Accordingly, where, as here, the agency presents scientifically respectable conclusions
which appellants are able to dispute with rival evidence of presumably equal dignity, we will not
displace the administrative choice." Louisiana v. Verity, 853 F.2d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 1988) (emphasis
added; footnotes and citations omitted).
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the agency's exclusive authority to list a species and to make associated
biological determinations concerning the species range was recognized by
the First Circuit.8'
Presumably, considerable deference also would be appropriate in
reviewing an agency's scientific determination concerning what constitutes
a distinct population. Of course, the conclusions must be scientifically
acceptable with some support in the record.82
Judicial review of the agency decision concerning whether a salmon
stock constitutes a "distinct population" would be governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (APA). Under section 706,
the reviewing court must satisfy itself that agency decisions are not
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law "83 The relevant inquiry is whether the agency "considered
the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made."84
2. The Rational Basis for the NMFS Policy Statement
From a common sense perspective, there is a rational basis for the
NMFS policy statement concerning population determinations. The two-
part test specifies the relevant factors to be used in determining the
existence of a distinct population. The first part of this test focuses on the
degree of reproductive isolation. A common dictionary definition of
"distinct" is "separate" or "apart from." In addition, as a biological term,
"population" includes the idea of reproductive isolation or separation.
The second part of the test focuses on the importance of the population
in the evolutionary legacy of the species. "Distinct" in this sense refers to
"uniqueness" or "importance" rather than "separateness." This interpre-
tation appears justifiable, especially given the context.
The NMFS policy statement is consistent with the stated purposes
and policy of the Act. First, the policy is designed to provide a means "for
accomplishing the major goal of the Act-to conserve genetic diversity of
81. "Certainly the initial determination of whether a species is endangered is within the
Secretary's exclusive authority, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 171-72,98 S.Ct. at 2290-2291 Wesee
no reason why the Secretary should not have similar authority to ascertain the appropriate range in
which the species is endangered." Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park v. U.S. E.P.A., 684 F.2d 1041,
1050, n.5 (1st Cir. 1982).
82. Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F Supp. 479, 482 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988); Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976,981-
82 (9th Cir. 1985).
84. Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 982 (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983)); see also Village of Kaktovik v. Corps of
Engineers, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. 1740 (D. Alaska 1978).
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species and the ecosystems they inhabit. '8 5 In addition, the policy "allows
discretion in the listing of populations by requiring that they represent
units of real evolutionary significance to the species. '8 6 This approach to
population determinations resolves the apparent inconsistency concerning
the amount of discretion the agency has in making population and listing
determinations and seems consistent with indications of legislative intent.
Some legislative history suggests that the agency has broad discretion
in making population and listing determinations, and states that agencies
should "use the ability to list populations sparingly and only when the
biological evidence indicates that such action is warranted. '87 But there
are subsequent indications that this type of decision may be
nondiscretionary 88
While the ESA specifies the five factors to be considered in the listing
process, there is some discretion in analyzing data and information
relevant to each factor.8 ' Thus, one could claim that agencies have latitude
in making determinations concerning whether a species qualifies as
endangered or threatened.90
Alternatively, one could argue that the ESA does not provide much
discretion with respect to the listing decision itself, but that some discretion
may exist concerning the prerequisite determination concerning what
constitutes a listable unit or "species" under the ESA. The amount of
discretion may be broadest in cases of population determinations.
Finally, one could argue that there is little discretion if, based upon the
best scientific data available, the agency believes that a group of organisms
constitutes a distinct population and that group is endangered or
threatened; in that case, the agency must list this species under the ESA.
However, many cases involve scientific uncertainty or disagreement
concerning what constitutes a population. While members of different
species do not generally interbreed and produce fertile offspring, the
standards for differentiating between populations are less clear. While
85. Robin Waples, Definition of a "Species" under the Endangered Species Act: Application to
Pacific Salmon (NMFS Technical Memorandum 1991) at vii.
86. Id.
87. S. Rep. No. 151, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), reprinted in Cong. Research Service, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT OF 1973 (Comm. Print
1982) at 1397.
88. For example, the legislative history of the 1982 Amendments indicates that the Secretary
has "mandatory, nondiscretionary duties" under the listing process. H.R. Rep. No. 835, 97th Cong.,
2d. Sess. (1982) at 20. Similarly, in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981),
the court concluded that an environmental impact statement was not required in order to list certain
mussels as endangered under the ESA, in large part, because of the absence of discretion in the listing
process.
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (b)(1).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20).
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there is restricted gene flow between populations, gene flow may occur at
many levels, making it difficult to identify what is a population and what is
not.9
More importantly, the definition of "species" does not merely refer to
the term "population," but rather, it refers to "any distinct population
segment of any species of vertebrate or wildlife which interbreeds when
mature,"92 and there may be considerable latitude in interpreting this
phrase.
A determination concerning a whether a group of fish or wildlife
constitutes a "distinct population" is an essential part of the listing process
and, as such, the decision should be based "solely on the basis of the best
scientific and commercial data available -91 The NMFS policy
statement stresses the need to make population determinations on this
basis and indicates the agency will rely on its biological expertise and the
expertise of the scientific community 94
Furthermore, the NMFS policy appears consistent with congres-
sional intent. In some cases, there may be considerable scientific latitude
concerning what constitutes a distinct population, but the degree of
latitude must be analyzed in the context of the stated purposes and policy of
the ESA and in terms consistent with legislative intent.95 While it can be
argued that there may be some flexibility in interpreting "distinct
population," these interpretations should reflect the purposes, policies, and
intentions of Congress. The NMFS policy appears consistent with the
broad values and goals enunciated by Congress.
91. See n. II and 12.
92. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1988).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A). See also n. 42-43 and related discussion.
94. "NMFS will use the best scientific and commercial data available and will rely on the
biological expertise of the agency and the scientific community in making 'species' determinations
under the ESA. A 'species' determination must be supported by scientific evidence."
56 Fed. Reg. 58,618 (1991).
95. "The stated purposes of the ESA are 'to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for
the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species.' (ESA section 2(b)). A review of
the legislative history indicates that a major motivating factor behind the ESA was the desire to
preserve genetic variability, both between and within species. For example, the House of Representa-
tives described the rationale for H.R. 37, a forerunner to the ESA, in the following terms (H.R. Rep.
No. 412, 93d Cong., 1973):
From the narrowest possible point of view, it is in the best interests of mankind to minimize
the losses of genetic variations. The reason is simple: They are keys to puzzles which we
cannot yet solve, and may provide the answers to the questions which we have not yet learned
to ask."
56 Fed. Reg. 10,543 (1991).
See also n. 20-24 and the associated discussion. The relevant legislative history is reprinted in
Cong. Research Service, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OFTHE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT OF 1973 AT 144 (Comm. Print 1982).
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In addition, the NMFS policy appears consistent with the Congres-
sional concern regarding the much more narrowly defined problem of the
city park squirrel population. 6 Although such a population may be
reproductively isolated, it is doubtful that such a population would
represent an important component of the evolutionary legacy of the
species; consequently it would not be considered a "distinct population"
and would not be entitled to listing under the ESA.
CONCLUSION
The ESA established a broad framework for identifying species in
danger of or threatened with extinction. Legislative history, while useful in
explaining the purposes, policy and broad goals of the ESA, does not
provide definitive guidance concerning how the terms "species" and
especially, "distinct population" should be interpreted. Congress has not
directly addressed or resolved these precise issues. While some legislative
history exists, there is far from absolute resolution concerning the meaning
Congress intended these terms to have.
Likewise, case law is sparse. The few relevant decisions, while
including some discussion of the importance of interbreeding, do not
provide answers to specific questions concerning the meaning of these
terms. Given this situation, an agency should have considerable latitude in
interpreting the statute and resolving detailed questions where there are
gaps in the statute.
To fill these gaps, NMFS has published a final policy to address the
issue of how the definition of "species" should be applied in evaluating
Pacific salmon stocks for listing under the ESA. While NMFS has
attempted to give these terms content, the limitations of a policy developed
specifically for salmon are obvious. Unlike many species, most salmon
species conceivably could be divided into hundreds or even thousands of
population units. Furthermore, the population dynamics, special habitat
requirements, and unique life cycles of anadromous fish make salmon
somewhat unique. The factors considered in making population determi-
nations concerning other species, including other marine species, espe-
cially where much less is known concerning population structure and
where the number of population units may be far fewer, may be considera-
bly different.
Nonetheless, given these limitations, the NMFS policy provides a
particularly interesting background for discussing special problems and
questions concerning how the ESA should be interpreted. The legal
analysis provided in this article, the policy paper issued by NMFS, and the
96. See n. 30-34.
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precedent established by NMFS in making species determinations for
various stocks of salmon provide more specific guidance concerning the
meaning of "species" under the ESA.
The exercise of agency discretion is inherent in making determina-
tions concerning whether or not a group of organisms qualifies as a
"distinct population," and thus, a "species" under the ESA, however,
economic or political considerations should not be involved. Rather these
determinations should be based on biological and scientific judgment. At
least with respect to Pacific salmon, policymakers should base determina-
tions concerning whether a stock is a "distinct population," first, on the
degree of the stock's reproductive isolation, and second, the importance of
the stock to the ecological and genetic diversity of the species as a whole.
As with other ESA issues, the issue of what constitutes a "species" or
"distinct population" is controversial. Ambiguities concerning the mean-
ing of these terms are not resolved by an analysis of the statute, legislative
history or case law, and may be subject to future litigation. This issue, as
well as other issues concerning the protection of salmon in the Columbia
River system, will join the long list controversies surrounding this Act.
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